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ERISA-EXCEPTIONS TO THE ANTI-ALIENATION PROVISION: 
STRENGTHENING ERISA's PROTECTION THROUGH A FRAUD 
AMENDMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974 as a comprehensive regulation of employee pension 
and benefit plans. 1 Congress found pension regulation necessary be­
cause of both the large number of workers affected by pension and 
benefit plans and the plans' economic impact on the national econ­
omy.2 ERISA's overall goals include protecting pension plan partici­
pants and their beneficiaries, and providing clearly defined standards 
for plan participation and supervision.3 
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001·1461 (1982 & Supp. II 1984». ERISA repealed previous pension regulations en· 
acted in the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85·836, 72 
Stat. 997 (previously codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309) (repealed 1974). 
ERISA is composed of four titles. The primary focus of this comment is on Title I, 
which regulates the conduct of pension providers by requiring reporting and disclosure, 
and by imposing fiduciary duties on plan trustees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1982 & Supp. 
II 1984). Title II of ERISA provides tax regulations for pension plans, and contains Inter­
nal Revenue Code pension provisions. I.R.C. §§ 401-419A (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Title 
III provides regulations for compliance with Titles I and II. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-42 (1982 & 
Supp. II 1984). Title IV contains provisions for plan termination. [d. §§ 1301-1461. 
2. Section 100 1 (a) provides, in part: 
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee bene­
fit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope 
and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; ... that they have 
become an important factor in commerce because of the interstate character of 
their activities . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § l001(a) (1982). 
The private pension system grew rapidly between 1950 and 1970. During that period, 
the aggregate amount of money held in private pension plans increased from 12.1 billion 
dollars to 137.1 billion dollars. E. ALLEN, J. MELONE, & J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION 
PLANNING 3 (4th ed. 1981) (Table 1-1). The estimated total today stands at over one 
trillion dollars, and could rise to over four trillion dollars by the year 2000. N.Y. Times, 
July 27, 1985, § 1, at 46, col. 5. 
3. Under ERISA, a plan participant is "any employee or former employee ... who is 
. . . eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan . . . or whose 
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982). Plan 
beneficiaries are designated by the plan participant and may be entitled to receive a benefit 
from the ERISA plan. [d. § 1002(8). Persons supervising ERISA plans are considered 
plan fiduciaries. ERISA's fiduciary provisions are discussed infra at notes 25-39 and ac­
companying text. 
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ERISA provides pension' regulation that includes plan coverage 
requirements,4 minimum vesting standards,s and fiduciary duties and 
responsibilities for plan administrators.6 Congress enacted these and 
other ERISA provisions in order to provide greater protection to pen­
sion plan participants.7 Another ERISA protection is the anti-aliena­
4. 29 U.S.C. § l003(a) (1982). Under this section, ERISA provisions "shall apply to 
any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained ... by any employer engaged in 
commerce ...." 29 U.S.C. § l003(a)(I). ERISA's coverage provisions exclude govern­
mental pension plans; plans established and maintained by a tax exempt church; plans 
established to comply with workers' compensation statutes, unemployment compensation, 
or disability statutes; plans maintained outside of the United States for the benefit of non­
resident aliens; and plans benefiting management employees, the management contribu­
tions to which exceed Internal Revenue Code limits and are paid out of the corporation's 
general assets. Id. § l003(b). 
5. Id. §§ 1051-1061. Prior to enactment of ERISA's vesting provisions, employees 
could lose their pension benefits if the employees were terminated by their employer or left 
voluntarily, even if they worked at the same job for several years. Congress recognized the 
inequity of this situation and responded by providing for "vesting" of the employees' bene­
fits. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4644-45. 
When employee benefits become "vested," they are nonforfeitable and nonrevocable, 
even if the employer/employee relationship is terminated. Each ERISA plan must contain 
a schedule for benefit vesting which delineates the time required to vest a specific portion of 
the pension benefit. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1982). 
6. Id. §§ 1101-1114 (1982). ERISA provides fiduciary standards and imposes fiduci­
ary duties on anyone who has discretionary authority or control over ERISA plan assets. 
This includes the named plan trustees, investment counselors, and even corporate officers 
and directors. D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 49 (4th ed. 1979). 
The Supreme Court, defining ERISA's fiduciary responsibilities, stated: 
[T]he fiduciary obligations of plan administrators are to serve the interest of par­
ticipants and beneficiaries and, specifically, to provide them with the benefits au­
thorized by the plan. But the principal statutory duties imposed on the trustees 
relate to the proper management, administration, and investment of fund assets, 
the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and 
the avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1985). These provi­
sions, however, do not cover persons or institutions that exercise non-discretionary func­
tions related to ERISA plans. See Forys V. United Food & Commercial Worker's Int'l 
Union, 829 F.2d 603, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1987) (union which only presented claims to em­
ployer under health benefit plan maintained for union members is not a fiduciary under 
ERISA). Section II(A) of this comment discusses ERISA's fiduciary provisions in greater 
depth. 
7. The House Report discussing the need for ERISA legislation stated: 
Underlying the provisions of this Act is a recognition of the necessity for a com­
prehensive legislative program dealing not only with malfessance and maladmin­
istration in the plans, or the consequences of lack of adequate vesting, but also 
with the broad spectrum of questions such as adequacy of funding, plant shut 
downs and plan terminations, adequate communication to participants, and, in 
short, the establishment of certain minimum standards to which all private pen­
sion plans must conform . . . . 
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. 
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tion provision, which prohibits assignment or alienation of pension 
and profit-sharing plan benefits. 8 Each pension and profit-sharing 
plan mqst contain an anti-alienation provision in order to qualify as an 
ERISA plan.9 Since ERISA's enactment, various _courts have found 
implied exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provision, based upon 
what the courts reason was the intent of Congress in the enactment. 
These implied exceptions include a now codified exception for quali­
fied domestic relations orders, and an exception in the area of bank­
ruptcy.to Recently, two United States Courts of Appeals examined 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision and disagreed over the existence of 
an implied exception for fraud. I I The United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard, 
Ltd. 12 held that ERISA's anti-alienation provision does not prohibit 
the garnishment of pension plan funds in cases of fraud. 13 In contrast, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United 
Metal Products Corp. v. National Bank ofDetroit 14 held that no fraud 
exception exists. 15 
The Crawford and United Metal decisions illustrate the difficulty 
NEWS 4639, 4647-48. For a general discussion of ERISA's enactment and some of the 
policy concerns that led to the enactment, see Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Secur­
ity Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 219 (1975); Note, The Employee Retirement 
Income and Security Act of1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 539 (1975). 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(I) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). The anti-alienation provision 
states: "Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be 
assigned or alienated." Id. A parallel nonalienation provision is found in Internal Revenue 
Code § 401(a)(13), which is incorporated into Title II of ERISA. Section 401(a)(13) pro­
vides: "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of 
which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under ihe plan may not be as­
signed or alienated." I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1978). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982 & 
Supp. II 1984). 
Both the ERISA and Internal Revenue Code sections exclude the application of the 
anti-alienation requirement in a case where the person seeking part of the ERISA plan 
participant's assets in the plan has obtained a qualified domestic relations order. The codi­
fied domestic relations exception is explored further in Section I1(C) of this comment. 
9. Id. § 1056(d)(I) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
10. The domestic relations exception is discussed in Section II(C) of this comment. 
Section III of this comment discusses the background and reasoning behind the bankruptcy 
exception. . 
11. Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987), reh'g denied, 108 S.Ct. 735 (1988); United Metal Prod. v. 
National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1494 
(1988). 
12. 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987), reh'g denied, 
108 S. Ct. 735 (1988). 
13. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 120. 
14. 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988). 
15. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299-300. 
. 
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that courts encouriter when determining the scope and impact of ER­
ISA's anti-alienation provision. In order to analyze this difficulty, this 
comment first provides an overview of ERISA's general purpose and 
its fiduciary provisions. It then describes the statute's anti-alienation 
provision, considering the provision's purpose and legislative history. 
Next, the comment examines the codified domestic relations exception 
and the jUdicially. created bankruptcy exception. The comment then 
focuses on the judicial disagreement over the existence of an implied 
exception in cases of employee or fiduciary fraud. Concluding that a 
fraud exception is, necessary in order to further ERISA's goal of par­
ticipant protection, this comment advocates amending ERISA's anti­
alienation provision to provide for such a statutory exception. 
I. ERISA-THE GOAL OF PARTICIPANT PROTECTION 
Prior to ERISA's enactment, many pension plan participants 
found that plan fund mismanagement and other abuses by those con­
trolling pension and benefit plans prevented their receiving earned 
pension benefits.16 Some plan participants invested in these plans for 
several years, expecting a retirement income, only to see their benefits 
disappear due to employment termination, fiduciary misconduct, or 
plan mismanagement. 17 
Early pension reform legislation proved to be inadequate in pro­
16. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4642, 5177. For a general discussion of the concerns which brought 
about ERISA, see Snyder, supra note 7, at 220-24. Professor Snyder discusses several 
problems addressed by ERISA, including inadequate vesting, coverage, funding, disclosure 
of information to employees, and inadequate protection to plan participants. See also 
Preminger, Jennings & Alexander, What Do You Get with the Gold Watch? An Analysis of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 426 (1975). 
17. Congress recognized that these and other problems existed in the private pension 
system and made its intent to protect participants clear in 29 U.S.C. § 100 1 (b) (1982), 
which provides: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate com­
merce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefi­
ciaries ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for 
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, 
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts. 
Id. Employee termination, prior to ERISA, could have meant the loss of pension benefits 
to the plan participant, a fact noted by the House Committee on Ways and Means: 
"[P]ension rights which have slowly stockpiled over many years may suddenly be lost if the 
employee leaves or loses his job prior to retirement." H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 53, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4670,4719. When examin­
ing ERISA's legislative history, the Supreme Court remarked that the "crucible of congres­
sional concern was [the] misuse and mismanagement of plan assets ...." Massachusetts 
Mut. Life Ins. CO. V. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141 n.8 (1985). 
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viding protection to plan participants, investment security, and stan­
dards of conduct for those charged with managing pension and benefit 
plans. ls In the early 1970's, both labor and management called for 
reforms in the private pension system. In response to this call, Con­
gress enacted ERISA.19 
ERISA's primary purpose is to protect pension and benefit plan 
participants and their beneficiaries.20 By legislating various provisions 
concerning benefit vesting, plan funding, and plan termination, Con­
gress intended to protect plan participants and their beneficiaries by 
improving the equitable character and soundness of pension and bene­
fit plans.21 For example, ERISA's benefit vesting standards are 
designed to insure that employees receive their benefits once they meet 
required conditions of employment.22 Additionally, Title IV requires 
ERISA plans to maintain plan termination insurance in order to pro­
tect plan participants, should the employer or the pension plan go into 
bankruptcy.23 Another mechanism utilized by Congress to protect 
plan participants was increasing the accountability of persons who ad­
minister ERISA plans. This comment now discusses that protection 
mechanism. 
18. ERISA repealed the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85­
836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (previously codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309). Congress enacted 
the Welfare Pension Plans Disclosure Act primarily in response to problems in the area of 
employer/employee relations. Mismanagement and abuse in the private pension system led 
to the early general reforms. However, these early reforms did not go far enough in pro­
tecting plan participants because they did not provide the fiduciary standards and other 
protections provided by ERISA. For further discussion of the inadequacies of the earlier 
Act, see Issacson, Employee Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection ofEm­
ployee Rights, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 96 (1959). 
19. S. REp. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4840-42. 
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
21. Section 1001(c) provides, in part: 
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Chapter to protect ... the 
interests of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improv­
ing the equitable character and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to 
vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet 
minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance. 
29 U.S.C. § lOOI(c) (1982). 
22. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (quoting Nach­
man Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980» (" '[I]f a worker has 
been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement - and if he has fulfilled whatever 
conditions are required ... he [should] actually receiver] it.' ").' 
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). The plan termination require­
ments include the filing of notice to terminate an ERISA plan, the court appointment of a 
trustee to oversee the termination, allocation of plan assets to participants and beneficiaries, 
and an order of priority in the distribution of plan assets. Id. 
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A. Fiduciary Obligations under ERISA 
Congress enacted ERISA's fiduciary provisions in response to the 
need for clearly defined duties and responsibilities for those who man­
aged and controlled pension and benefit plans.24 In order to provide 
structure to the plan administrators' tasks, Congress enacted specific 
standards of conduct for persons in a fiduciary relationship to plan 
participants, and also provided remedies for breaches of fiduciary 
duties.2s 
ERISA provides that a person is a fiduciary to a pension or bene­
fit plan if "he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management of ... [a] plan or exercises any au­
thority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets 
... or ... he has any ... discretionary responsibility in the administra­
tion of such plan."26 Each employee benefit plan must be "established 
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument," and the writing is 
required to name one or more fiduciaries who jointly or severally will 
have the authority to control and manage the benefit plan.27 The fidu­
ciaries may retain an investment counselor, financial advisor, or other 
money management service to assist them in operating the benefit 
plan.28 Financial consultants, however, become plan fiduciaries if they 
provide "investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan."29 
Benefit and pension plan fiduciaries are held to the "prudent 
man" standard of care.30 This standard provides that the plan fiduci­
ary must act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like ca­
pacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims."31 When managing 
ERISA plans, fiduciaries are to perform their duties solely in the inter­
ests of plan participants and their beneficiaries. 32 
The widespread misuse and poor management of employee bene­
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
26. Id. § l002(21)(A)(i) and (iii) (1982). 
27. Id. § 1102(a)(I) (1982). 
28. Id. § l102(c)(2), (3) (1982). 
29. [d. § l002(21)(A)(ii) (1982). 
30. [d. § 1100(a) (1982). 
31. [d. § 1100(a)(i)(B) (1982). 
32. Id. Section 1100(a) provides, in part: "[Al fiduciary shall discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... for 
the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries ....n 
[d. 
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fit plans compelled Congress to impose fiduciary duties and responsi­
bilities not only on plan administrators, but also on anyone exercising 
discretionary control over plan funds. 33 As a further protection, ER­
1sA prohibits various types of transactions which involve potential 
conflicts of interest.34 Self-dealing, dealing with parties whose inter­
ests are adverse to those of plan participants, and receiving personal 
consideration from those doing business with the plan are examples of 
prohibited transactions. 35 Congress also provided remedies for plan 
participants when a fiduciary breach occurs.36 ERISA provisions al­
Iowa fiduciary to be held personally liable if the fiduciary's breach 
33. S. REp. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4639,5171,5186. Both the House and Senate ranking committee members 
commented on imposing fiduciary duties. Representative AI Ullman, ranking majority 
member of the House committee, wrote: "Standards are established for fiduciaries of pen­
sion plans to protect against possible misuse of pension funds. [T]ransactions likely to 
prove inimical to the interests of the plan participants are specifically prohibited." Id. at 
35, 5171. Senator Harrison Williams, Jr. echoed these sentiments, pointing out that the 
fiduciary standards are in place "to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan 
assets." Id. at 42, 5186. 
34. 	 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982). Under § 1106, a fiduciary is prohibited from engaging 
in transactions involving plan assets if the fiduciary 
knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect ­
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property ... ; (B) lending of money or 
other extension of credit ... ; (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities be­
tween the plan and a party in interest; (D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit 
of a party in interest, of any assets of the plan; or (E) acquisition, on behalf of the 
plan, of any employer security or employer real property .... 
Id. 
ERISA defines a "party in interest" as any fiduciary, administrator, officer, trustee, 
custodian, counsel, or employee of an ERISA benefit plan, or a person providing services to 
the ERISA plan, or any employer whose employees are covered by the plan. Id. 
§ l002(14)(A)-(D) (1982). This section also includes as a party in interest those who own, 
directly or indirectly, fifty percent or more of the stock in a company or corporation pro­
viding an ERISA plan for its employees. Any shareholder, whether employee, director, or 
officer of a corporation, who holds ten percent or more of stock in the corporation, and any 
corporation that itself owns fifty percent or more of the stock or beneficial interest in a 
corporation also is considered a party in interest. Id. 
35. Id. § 1106(b) (1982). For further discussion of congressional purpose regarding 
prohibited transactions, see S. REp. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4838. See also Dimond v. Retirement Plan, 582 F. 
Supp. 892, 899 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Botto v. Friedberg, 568 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 
1982); McDougall v. Donovan, 552 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
36. 	 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982). In part, § 1109(a) provides: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter 
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan result­
ing from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduci­
ary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and 
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. 
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causes a loss of plan assets.37 When a breach occurs, a civil action for 
recovery of plan assets can be brought against a plan fiduciary by a 
plan participant, beneficiary, other fiduciary, or by the Secretary of 
Labor.38 In order to give courts wide latitude when dealing with fidu­
ciary duties and remedies for breaches, Congress made traditional 
trust principles applicable to situations involving breaches of fiduciary 
duty.39 
Id. 
One example of an equitable remedy used by the courts is the judicial rescission of 
unlawful transactions. In Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Okla. 1978), the 
court held that ERISA's fiduciary provisions granted wide latitude in adopting remedies 
for fiduciary breaches, including rescinding an illegal loan transaction entered into by a 
plan fiduciary. Id. at 344. More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec­
ond Circuit examined several transactions between two corporations, Tower Capital, Inc. 
and Tower Securities; Inc., and concluded that several of these transactions violated ER­
ISA's prohibited transaction provision because of dealings with parties whose interests 
were adverse to those of the plan members. The court held the corporations, and the indi­
vidual officers, liable to the corporate pension plan in the amount of $1,087,787.00. Lowen 
v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1211-21 (2d Cir. 1987). 
37. Courts have used their discretion in fashioning equitable remedies when dealing 
with fiduciary breaches, including using the fiduciary's vested benefits to offset the loss to 
the plan. See Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 735 (1988). See a/so Gilliam v. 
Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (D. N.J. 1980) (union's pension fund manager was held 
personally liable for fiduciary breach); Kelly, 465 F. Supp. at 354 (profit-sharing plan 
trustee must repay plan monies after being found in violation of ERISA's fiduciary 
provisions). 
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982). The statute provides: 

A civil action may be brought­
(1) 	 by a participant or beneficiary . . . 
(B) 	 to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan; 
(2) 	 by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate 
relief under section 1109 of this title . . . . 
Id. 
An example of a court's interpretation of this provision is found in Morse v. New 
York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund, 580 F. Supp. 180, 184 
(W.D.N.Y. 1983) (participant in a union pension fund allowed to bring an action against 
fiduciary). See a/so Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119 (plan participants allowed to bring action 
against plan fiduciaries); Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1209 (plan trustees brought an action against 
corporation and three majority shareholders for violations of ERISA's prohibited transac­
tion provisions). 
39. 120 CONGo RIle. H8702 (Aug. 20, 1974) (Statement of Rep. Ullman), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5166,5171. Congress, discussing the fiduciary 
duties and remedies enacted in ERISA, made clear that its objective was the application of 
the principles and remedies of trust law. As an additional protection, Congress directed 
that ERISA's corollary labor and tax provisions are also to apply to fiduciary breaches. Id. 
C/. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS 341-48 (6th ed. 19~7). An indication of this intent is found in 
§ 1103, which provides that benefit plan assets will be held in trust. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) 
(1982). There are, however, some limited exceptions to this provision. See. e.g., 29 U.S.C. 
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ERISA's fiduciary provisions are an example" of the protections 
that ERISA provides to plan participants. These provisions provide 
practical standards for persons managing and controlling ERISA 
plans. Another example of congressional protection for ERISA plan 
participants is the anti-alienation provision, which prohibits the as­
signment or alienation of ERISA plan benefits. 
B. The Anti-Alienation Provision 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision provides that "[e]ach pension 
plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be 
assigned or alienated."4O In enacting this provision, Congress in­
tended to expand ERISA protection to "ensure that the employee's 
accrued benefits are actually available for retirement purposes."41 A 
corollary anti-alienation provision is found in Internal Revenue Code 
section 401(a)(13), which expands on the incomplete language of the 
ERISA anti-alienation provision.42 Because Congress delegated ER­
ISA tax enforcement to the Treasury Department,43 courts have used 
Internal Revenue Code section 401(a)(13) when faced with an issue 
requiring interpretation of the incomplete language of ERISA's anti­
alienation provision.44 The Internal Revenue Code anti-alienation 
provision is given greater definition in its accompanying regulation, 
which provides that an ERISA-qualified plan must require that bene­
fits may not "be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), 
§ l103(b) (1982) (providing that the trust requirement does not apply to plan assets that 
consist of insurance policies, insurance contracts, and plan assets which are exempted from 
this requirement by the Secretary of Labor). Section IV(C) of this comment explores the 
implications of applying traditional trust principles to cases of fraud by plan participants or 
fiduciaries. 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(I) (1982). 
41. H.R. REp. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4734. 
42. ERISA's anti-alienation provision is incomplete in the sense that it fails to ad­
dress explicitly the issues of attachment, garnishment, or levies against plan assets. Conse­
quently, courts have differed on the interpretation of ERISA's anti-alienation provision, 
and have allowed for implied exceptions to the provision. 
43. H.R. REp. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5139. 
44. One court commented: "Garnishment is not mentioned in ERISA. However, 
both ERISA and the section of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) dealing with 'qualified' 
pension ... plans contain provisions against assignment or alienation of plan benefits." 
General Motors v.Buha, 623 F.2d 455,460 (6th Cir. 1980). The Buha court also cited the 
Conference Committee report on the Treasury Department's involvement in ERISA, 
which provides that the Labor and Treasury Departments work cooperatively in establish­
ing and prescribing regulations under ERISA's general provisions. Id. at 462 (citing H. 
REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5038, 5139). 
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alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or 
other legal or equitable process."4S 
Given the treasury regulation's language and its application to 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision, it appears that pension plan funds 
are untouchable. In the area of third party judgment creditors, courts 
consistently have disallowed garnishment of plan funds.46 However, 
despite ERISA's seemingly unequivocal language, courts have inferred 
exceptions to the anti-alienation provision in the areas of domestic re­
lations, bankruptcy, and fraud. The focus of this comment now turns 
to an examination of the domestic relations exception as first inferred 
by the courts and then codified by Congiess.47 
C. The Domestic Relations Exception 
ERISA's stated purpose is to protect "the interests of participants 
in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries."48 Congressional 
concern focused on "the continued well-being and security of millions 
of employees and their dependents."49 Notwithstanding this stated 
purpose, Congress failed to provide clearly for dependents of pension 
plan participants in the statute. As originally enacted, ERISA's anti­
alienation provision did not address directly the issues raised in cases 
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b) (1978). The Buha court examined the I.R.C. anti­
alienation provision, and the treasury regulation, and, in view of expressed congressional 
intent, held that these tax provisions apply to corollary ERISA provisions. Buha, 623 F.2d 
at 461-63. 
46. An example of the minority view is found in one early opinion, which held that 
ERISA plan assets could be garnished by third party judgment creditors. The court rea­
soned that there was no distinction between a state's right to protect and regulate domestic 
relations and its right to ensure and protect commercial soundness. National Bank of N. 
Am. v. I.B.E.W. Local No.3, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 594,400 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1977), aff'd per curiam, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127, appeal dismissed as moot, 48 
N.Y.2d 752, 397 N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1979). Since that decision, most courts 
facing the issue have prohibited garnishment by commercial creditors and third party cred­
itors. See. e.g., Tenneco v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 689 (4th Cir. 1983); 
Buha, 623 F.2d at 463; Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 
510, 513 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Citizens Bank v. Shingler, 173 Ga. App. 511, 512, 326 S.E.2d 
861, 862 (1985); Peoples Fin. Co. v. Saffold, 83 Ill. App. 3d 120, 124,403 N.E.2d 765, 768 
(1980); Christ Hosp. v. Greenwald, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1028,403 N.E.2d 700,704 (1980). 
For further discussion of the anti-alienation provision, see Boyle, infra note 55, at 504-10. 
See also Comment, ERISA: Does It Prohibit a State Court from Attaching Plan Benefits?, 40 
U. PITf. L. REV. 47 (1978). 
47. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 104(a), 204(a), 98 Stat. 
1426, 1433-36, 1445 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1984». 
48. 29 U.S.C. § 100 1 (b) (1982) (e~phasis added). For a discussion of ERISA pur­
poses and congressional intent in the enactment, see supra notes 16-23 and accompanying 
text. 
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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of divorce and family support. Before the 1984 amendment, courts 
decided whether ERISA plan benefits could be alienated pursuant to a 
state court order for family or spousal support, with the majority of 
courts allowing plan fund alienation for such support. so There was, 
however, a divergence ofjudicial opinion that eventually induced Con­
gress to amend ERISA's anti-alienation provision.sl 
There is a typical factual scenario in which domestic relations 
support claims arise. A married couple divorces while one spouse is a 
participant in an ERISA plan, and a state court orders the plan par­
ticipant to provide spouse or child support. The participant falls into 
arrears on the support payments, and the fonner spouse brings an ac­
tion to garnish all or part of the participant's interest in the pension 
plan in order to satisfy the support obligation. Prevailing in the gar­
nishment proceeding, the fonner spouse then seeks to enforce the gar­
50. See, e.g., Bowen v. Bowen, 715 F.2d 559, 560-61 (11th Cir. 1983) (alienation of 
plan participant's plan assets permitted for alimony payments); Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 
740, 742 (9th Cir. 1980) (plan funds considered community property and are alienable), 
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (alien­
ation allowed for family support); Ball v. Revised Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees 
of Johns-Manville Corp., 522 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Colo. 1981) (plan funds alienable pur­
suant to state domestic relations decree); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pen­
sion Fund v. Parr, 480 F. Supp. 924, 925 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (alienation for alimony 
purposes allowed); Operating Eng'rs Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 470 
F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (D. Ariz. 1979) (alimony), off'd, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981); Senco, 
Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902, 908 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (family support); Cart1edge·v. Miller, 
457 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (family support); Cody v. Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 
22, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (family support), off'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Knapp v. 
Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. 1980) (child support); Western Elec. Co. v. Trapha­
gen, 166 N.J. Super. 418, 430, 400 A.2d 66, 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (child 
support); Ward v. Ward, 164 N.J. Super. 354, 362, 396 A.2d 365, 369 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1978) (support order); M.H. v. J.H., 93 Misc. 2d 1016, 1022,403 N.Y.S.2d 411,415­
16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (alimony); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d 784, 789, 401 
N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (alimony); Commonwealth ex reI. Magrini v. 
Magrini, 263 Pa. Super. 366, 373, 398 A.2d 179, 183 (1979) (family support). 
51. S. REp. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2564, 2565. 
Several cases have arisen in which courts have been required to detennine 
whether ERISA preemption and spendthrift provisions apply to family support 
obligations (e.g., alimony, separate maintenance, and child support obliga­
tions) .... [C]ourts have held that ERISA was not intended to preempt State 
domestic relations law pennitting the attachment of vested benefits for the pur­
pose of meeting these obligations. Some courts have held that the ERISA pre­
emption provision does not prevent application of State law permitting 
attachment of non vested benefits for the purpose of meeting family support obli­
gations . . . . There is a divergence of opinion among the courts as to whether 
ERISA preempts State community property laws insofar as they relate to the 
rights of a married couple to benefits under a pension, etc., plan. 
Id. at 2564 (footnotes omitted). 
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nishment order by serving notice on the administrators of the pension 
plan. The administrators then file an action to enjoin the garnishment 
pursuant to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. S2 
While the factual situations in domestic relations cases are often 
similar, both the courts' reasoning and conclusions as to the issue of 
benefit alienability are far from uniform. The differences among 
courts focus on ERISA's preemption provisions3 and its applicability 
to domestic relations cases. The preemption provision calls for ER­
ISA to supercede "any and all State laws insofar as they ... relate to 
any employee benefit plan."s4 Congress recognized the impact that 
pension plans have on the national economy, and intended ERISA to 
be the primary law of private pension plans. ss By enacting the pre­
emption provision, Congress attempted to achieve this purpose. Re­
quiring courts to consider pension claims under ERISA, rather than 
under state law; enforces congressional intent to have effective na­
tional pension regulation. 
Many courts have held that, despite the preemption and anti­
alienation provisions, ERISA provisions do not prohibit state courts 
from enforcing support orders by garnishing plan assets. These courts 
reason that the lack of express congressional intent, both in the statute 
itself and its legislative history, to preempt the states' right to regulate 
in the area of domestic relations bars ERISA from overriding state 
law.s6 Another reason is the courts' recognition that domestic rela­
tions is an important area of state regulation under the states' police 
52. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs' Local No. 428 v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196, 198 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 314 (2d Cir. 1979); AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 
118, 120 (2d Cir. 1979). 
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. § l00l(a) (1982). See also 120 CoNG. REc. 29, 33, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5188-89. Senator Williams, the Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, when discussing the formulation of the 
preemption provision, stated: 
[T]he substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are in­
tended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of 
confiicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. 
This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or 
local governments . . .. 
Id. For a more general discussion of ERISA's preemptive powers, see Comment, Attach­
ment of Pension Benefits Under ERISA, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 255 (1979). See also Boyle, 
Garnishment of Pension Benefits After ERISA, 34 Bus. LAW. SOl, 510-13 (1979); Note, 
Weakening ERISA's Preemptive Powers: St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Cox Cre­
ates an Implied Exception to the Anti-Alienation Provision for Employee Fraud, 6 VA. TAX 
REv. 185, 199-202 (1986). 
56. See, e.g., Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("As a 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation, courts have presumed that the basic po­
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power and, as such, should be given deference. 57 
An illustration of this reasoning is found in one of the first cases 
in which the domestic relations exception issue was considered. In 
Cartledge v. Miller,58 the United States District Court for the South­
ern District of New York allowed garnishment of pension plan funds 
in order to satisfy the plan participant's family support obligations. 59 
Mter holding that ERISA provisions did not preempt state domestic 
relations regulations,60 the court pointed out that other federal anti­
alienation provisions also did not supercede the obligations of family 
support,61 and held that ERISA provisions did not preempt state do­
mestic relations regulations.62 In rejecting the argument for strict con­
struction of the anti-alienation provision, the Cartledge court quoted 
Judge Learned Hand on the subject of statutory interpretation: .. '[I]t 
is a commonplace that a literal interpretation of the words of a statute 
is not always a safe guide to its meaning' and should be 'disregarded 
when it defeats the manifest purpose of the statute as a whole.' "63 
Because ERISA's purpose is to protect plan participants and their 
beneficiaries, the court reasoned that a literal construction of the anti-
lice powers of the States, particularly the regulation of domestic relations, are not super­
seded by federal legislation unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. "). 
57. See. e.g., AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1979). However, courts 
typically do not extend preemption deference to states under ERISA's preemption provi­
sion. One recent example in which a court upheld ERISA's preemption provision is found 
in Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1987). In 
this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, despite a 
Montana Probate Code provision which barred claims against a decedent's estate unless the 
claims were presented within four months of notice to creditors, ERISA provisions pre­
empt the Montana provision, and plan trustees may present a claim to the estate. Id. at 
1009-16. For a general discussion of ERISA preemption, see Gregory, The Scope 0/ERISA 
Preemption o/State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 427, 429-35 
(1987). . 
58. 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
59. Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1149. One case decided close in both time and reason­
ing to the Canledge decision was Cody v. Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
60. Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1154. The Cartledge court discussed this point of 
statutory interpretation and stated that courts traditionally defer to the states when the 
states regulate under their police powers, especially regulations in the area of domestic 
relations. Id. The court reasoned that this deference to the states prohibited ERISA's 
preemption of state law in domestic relations claims. Id. 
61. Id. at 1155. Other anti-alienation provisions that the court found did not 
supercede state family law concerns included: the Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. 
§ 3101(a) (1982); the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1984); and the Railway Retire­
ment Act, 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1983). Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1155. 
62. Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1155 (concluding that ERISA's provisions were not 
enacted to insulate the family provider from support obligations). 
63. Id. at 1154 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 
487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) 
(Hand, J., concurring»). 
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alienation provision would prevent the proper support of ERISA bene­
ficiaries, and thereby undermine the protections that Congress in­
tended.64 Additionally, the Labor and Treasury Departments filed an 
amicus curiae brief supporting the inapplicability of the anti-alienation 
provision to a family support claim.65 Considering ERISA's statutory 
purpose, the failure of Congress to explicitly preempt domestic rela­
tions law, principles of statutory construction, previous exemptions to 
other anti-alienation provisions, and the government's position, the 
Cartledge court held that the anti-alienation provision did not prevent 
the garnishment of a plan participant's plan assets pursuant to a state 
court support order. 66 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reached a similar result in AT&T v. Merry.67 In Merry, a divorce de­
cree obligated Mr. Merry to pay alimony and child support amounting 
to one-half of his retirement income from a pension plan at AT&T. 
Mr. Merry failed to make the support payments, and Mrs. Merry ob­
tained a state court garnishment order on his pension plan interest. 
AT&T moved for a declaratory judgment, seeking to clarify its fiduci­
ary obligations under ERISA's fiduciary and anti-alienation provi­
sions.68 The Merry court followed much of the reasoning in Cartledge 
and rejected a strict construction of the anti-alienation provision.69 
The court took the position that prior decisions adopting a literal con­
struction of the anti-alienation provision neglected to give proper con­
sideration to public policy concerns in the area of family support and 
to the state's interest in having a spouse fulfill support obligations.70 
In the cases that followed, some courts followed the Cartledge 
and Merry position,71 while other courts held that pension plan bene­
64. Id. The court noted passages of the Congressional Record which indicated that 
protection of dependents was a congressional concern. Id. For further discussion of con­
gressional intent to protect dependents of plan participants, see supra notes 16-23 and 
accompanying text. 
65. Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1156. Citing the government's amicus brief, the court 
stated: "The Government takes the position, which appears reasonable and correct, that 
'family support decrees were not intended to be within the scope of the anti-alienation 
provisions of ERISA.''' Id. 
66. Id. at 1154. 
67. 592 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1979). 
68. Id. at 120. 
69. Id. at 119, 123, 125. 
70. Id. at 123. For a general discussion of ERISA and non-ERISA pension fund 
distribution on divorce, see Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 
19 FAM. L.Q. 331, 379-84 (1986). 
71. See. e.g., Smith v. MiTman, 749 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1984); Tenneco v. First 
Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1983); Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears 
Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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fits were not alienable in family support claims. These early decisions 
applied a literal construction to state pension plans' anti-alienation 
provisions and did not allow alienation in domestic relations claims. 72 
Since enactment of ERISA's preemption provision, some courts have 
read the provision literally and have disallowed alienation in domestic 
relations claims.73 A literal interpretation of ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision, or another similarly worded anti-alienation provision, in 
conjunction with the preemption provision, forces courts to refuse en­
forcement of a domestic relations support order because that order 
seeks to garnish ERISA or other pension plan funds. 
Congress, seeing that the courts differed on the interpretation of 
the anti-alienation provision, codified a domestic relations exception in 
1984.74 The anti-alienation provision now provides that "[e]ach pen­
sion plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in accordance with 
the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations or­
der."7s A qualified domestic relations order is an order that: (1) rec­
ognizes the right of an alternative payee to receive all or part of the 
plan participant's interest in the pension plan, (2) relates to child sup­
port, alimony, or property rights in a non-member spouse or depen­
dent, and (3) is issued pursuant to a state domestic relations or 
community property law.76 By codifying the judicially created excep­
tion for domestic relations support orders, Congress effectuated the 
notion that ERISA's protection extends beyond the interests of the 
plan participant. 
Another circumstance in which courts have inferred an exception 
72. See, e.g., Ogle v. Heim, 69 Cal. 2d 7, 9, 442 P.2d 659, 663, 69 Cal. Rptr. 579, 
581-83 (1968). In a case which arose prior to ERISA's enactment, the Ogle court held that 
the right to child support was not enforceable against a state pension plan. Id. at 9-11, 442 
P.2d at 659-63, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See also Mueller v. Mueller, 166 N.J. Super. 557, 557, 
400 A.2d 136, 136 (1979) (husband's pension benefits are not subject to equitable distribu­
tion in divorce proceedings); Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 14, 15,442 P.2d 663,664, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 583, 583 (1968) (right to alimony is not enforceable against a state pension 
plan). 
73. See, e.g., Merry, 592 F.2d at 123 (citing General Motors v. Townsend, 468 F. 
Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976), and Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 
(N.D. Cal. 1978». The Merry court distinguished its own reasoning from that of the Town­
send and United Technologies courts by pointing out that those courts failed to examine 
ERISA's preemption provision in light of the states' power to regulate domestic relations. 
The Townsend and United Technologies courts applied a rather perfunctory analysis to the 
domestic relations issue, relying solely on the explicit language of the anti-alienation provi­
sion. Id. 
74. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 1000a), 204(a), 98 Stat. 
1426, 1433-36, 1445 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1984». 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1984). 
76. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(l1) (Supp. II 1984). 
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to ERISA's anti-alienation provision is in bankruptcy claims. Some 
courts allow ERISA plan assets to be alienated in bankruptcy,77 while 
others hold that ERISA plan assets cannot be included in the debtor's 
bankruptcy estate.78 
II. JUDICIALLY CREATED BANKRUPTCY EXCEPTION 
Upon commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, all legal and 
equitable interests of the debtor become property of the debtor's estate 
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 541.79 Whether ERISA plan 
assets can be included in the debtor's estate has been the subject of 
numerous judicial opinions.80 Courts examine this question in relation 
to two sections of the Bankruptcy Code which, in some circumstances, 
allow the debtor to retain particular assets that otherwise would be 
included in the debtor's estate. Section 541(c)(2) excludes trust prop­
erty from the estate of the debtor, and section 522(b)(2)(A) exempts 
property from the estate that otherwise is exempt under federal law. 
Some courts reason that neither section applies to ERISA plans and 
hold that ERISA plan assets are included in the debtor's estate,8! 
while others reason that ERISA plan assets are not included in the 
debtor's estate. 82 
A. Purpose ofBankruptcy 
The technical effect of filing a bankruptcy petition is to " 'suspend 
the normal operation of rights and obligations between the debtor and 
his creditors.' "83 After suspending operations, a court-appointed 
bankruptcy trustee distributes the debtor's assets to various credi­
77. See infra note 129. 
78. See infra note 96. 
79. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982). Section 541(a)(I) provides, in part: "The com­
mencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such 
estate is comprised of ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case." Id. 
80. See infra note 81. 
81. See. e.g., Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 
1985); Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Samore v. Grah~ (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re 
Goil), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. (In re DiPiazza), 29 
Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Ross, 18 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982). 
82. See. e.g., In re Threewitt, 24 Bankr. 927, 929 (D. Kan. 1982) (ERISA's anti­
alienation provision bars creditors from reaching plan assets); In re Holt, 32 Bankr. 767, 
772 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (ERISA plan funds not alienable in bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
83. In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co., Inc., 715 F.2d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(quoting Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Simon, 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1979». The 
suspension of the operations of the debtor is effectuated by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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tors.84 From a practical standpoint, the purpose of bankruptcy is to 
allow the debtor to get a "fresh start" following the distribution of the 
debtor's estate to creditors.85 The Bankruptcy Code's focus, therefore, 
is twofold. First, it protects creditors' interests in the bankruptcy es­
tate by gathering all of the debtor's legal and equitable interests, and 
second, it protects a debtor from unjust and false claims and from total 
financial ruin. 86 
Under earlier versions of the Bankruptcy Code, these two pur­
poses were often in conflict. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,87 a 
recurring problem was the determination of what constituted the 
"property of the estate." Creditors sought any and all of the debtor's 
interests, stressing the need for recoupment of debts.88 Debtors, point­
ing to the "fresh start" purpose of the Act, argued for as many exclu­
sions and exemptions as possible.89 This conflict in interests 
~ 
eventually led to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.90 Despite the 
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). Section 362 provides for an automatic stay of any legal proceed­
ings, enforcement of any judgments, and collection of any debts owed by the debtor. Id. 
84. See, e.g., American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prod. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 
597 (7th Cir. 1986). 
85. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1966). See also S. REp. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 57~7, 5792 (''The 
committee feels that the policy ofthe bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start ...."). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also recognized the "fresh start" no­
tion. "Providing the bankrupt with a 'fresh start' means assuring him that assets to which 
he may become entitled in the future will be acquired free of any pre-bankruptcy obliga­
tions." In re Turpin, 644 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 1306-30 (1982), the "property 
of the estate" includes, in addition to property outlined in section 541(c)(2), any property 
acquired by the debtor, including earnings for services rendered by the debtor, after the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a 
case under Chapter 7 or 11. Id. 
86. Segal, 382 U.S. at 380. "It is the twofold purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to 
convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and then give 
the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched." 
Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913). It should be noted that there are distinct 
differences between the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Bankruptcy Code as it now exists. 
Among the differences is the expansion of what constitutes the property of the debtor's 
estate, discussed infra at notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
87. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979). 
88. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goll), 706 F.2d 574, 578 (5th eir. 1983). 
89. Id. For further discussion of what constitutes the property of the estate, see In re 
Parker, 473 F. Supp. 746, 749-50 (W.O.N.Y. 1979). 
90. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 333 (1984). For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, see Resnick & Wypyski, Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978: A Legislative His­
tory (1979)(volumes 1-17). See also Klee, Legislative History by the New Bankruptcy Code, 
54 AM. BANKR. L.l. 275 (1980). For examples of cases arising under the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, see CoLLIER BANKRUPTCY CASES 2d (1987)(volumes 1-17). 
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expansion of the "property of the estate" by Congress in the Bank­
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, this conflict continues. 
One major purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the 
Code) was to expand the concept of "the property of the estate." 
Under the Code, Congress intended that all property and interests of 
the debtor become part of the property of the debtor's estate. Thus, 
Congress favored creditors' interests when it attempted to resolve the 
conflicting interests in bankruptcy claims.91 
Courts examining creditors' claims against ERISA plan partici­
pants are faced with conflicting statutory policies. This conflict grows 
out of the Bankruptcy Code's policy of including all debtor interests in 
the property of the estate and ERISA's policy of insuring that the plan 
participant receives his or her pension benefits. The creditors' claims 
arise in similar factual circumstances. Usually, an ERISA plan par­
ticipant becomes insolvent and files a bankruptcy petition. The bank­
ruptcy trustee seeks the plan participant's interests in the ERISA plan 
in order to recover some or all of the debt owed to creditors.92 The 
plan participant, administrator, or fiduciary then files suit to enjoin the 
garnishment of the plan interest, alleging that ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision prohibits the garnishment.93 Additionally, the plan partici­
pant or administrator alleges that ERISA plan assets are, first, ex­
cluded from the property of the debtor's estate under Bankruptcy 
Code section 541(c)(2), or, second, are exempt from the debtor's estate 
under Code section 522(b)(2)(A). 
1. 	 Excluding Pension Funds under Section 541(c)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code 
Section 541(c)(2) allows exclusion of trust assets from the prop­
erty of the estate.94 The 'section states: "A restriction on the transfer 
of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under 
91. S. REP. No. 989, 95.th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5791-92. 
92. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1982). Section 323(a) provides that "[T]he trustee in a case 
under this title is the representative of the estate ... [and] has the capacity to sue and be 
sued." Id. A bankruptcy trustee acts on behalf of unsecured creditors and has several 
duties, including: (1) collecting and liquidating the property of the debtor's estate, (2) in­
vestigating the financial affairs of the debtor, (3) examining creditor claims, (4) furnishing 
bankruptcy estate information, as requested, to parties in interest, and (5) closing up all 
affairs of the bankruptcy estate as expeditiously as possible. Id. § 704 (1982). 
93. See. e.g., Lichstrahl V. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1488-90 
(lith Cir. 1985); Daniel V. Security Pac. Nafl Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1353-54 
(9th Cir. 1985); Samore V. Graham (In re Graham), 725 F.2d 1268, 1268-70 (8th Cir. 
1984); Goff V. Taylor (In re Goft), 706 F.2d 574, 574-76 (5th Cir. 1983). 
94. 	 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982). 
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applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this ti­
tle."9S Therefore, a debtor's interest in a trust becomes property of the 
bankruptcy estate unless the restriction on alienation contained in the 
trust is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Propertyex­
cluded under section S41(c)(2) never enters the debtor's estate, and, 
thus, when courts find ERISA's anti-alienation provision to be appli­
cable nonbankruptcy law under S41(c)(2), the ERISA pension fund 
assets do not enter the debtor's estate.96 Courts disagree, however, as 
to the proper interpretation, scope, and coverage of "applicable 
nonbankruptcy law." This disagreement prompts the difference in ju­
dicial opinion over whether ERISA plan funds are excluded from the 
bankruptcy estate.97 . 
Some courts read the legislative history of section S41(c)(2) to say 
that ERISA provisions do not qualify as "applicable nonbankruptcy 
law." These courts interpret that phrase to include only those trusts 
that qualify as spendthrift trusts under relevant state spendthrift trust 
statutes.98 Other courts disagree with the restrictive nature of that 
reading of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" and reason that a proper 
reading is one which includes ERISA's anti-alienation provision. Be­
cause these courts read "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as including 
ERISA provisions, they exclude ERISA plan funds from the debtor's 
95. Id. 
96. See, e.g., Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Three\\jtt), 24 Bankr. 927, 930 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (overturning bankruptcy court ruling that ERISA plan funds are 
property of the bankruptcy estate); In re Matteson, 58 Bankr. 909, 911 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1986) (ERISA plan funds excluded from the property of the bankruptcy estate); Warren v. 
, 	 G.M. Scott & Sons (In re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543, 546 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (debtor'S 
interest in an ERISA qualified plan is excluded from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 
section 541(c)(2»; Shults v. Rose's Stores, Inc. (In re Holt), 32 Bankr. 767, 772 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1983) (ERISA profit-sharing plan assets are excluded from the property of the 
bankruptcy estate); In re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181, 183 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (debtor's 
assets in ERISA profit-sharing plan are not property of the bankruptcy estate). 
97. Compare Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929 with Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In 
re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding no exclusion of ERISA funds from 
bankruptcy estate). 
98. See, e.g., Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 
1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 725 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor 
(In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). These courts -then examine the exemption 
scheme found in section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
Section 541(c)(2) is referred to as the "spendthrift trust exclusion" because of its legis­
lative history. A spendthrift trust haS been defined as a trust which "provide[s] for a right 
in a beneficiary to future income or principal of the trust, [and the] right to receive these 
payments in the future shall not be transferable ... or liable to be taken for the payment of 
... debts." G.G. BoGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE tAW OF TRUSTS 147 (5th 
ed. 1973). 
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barikruptcy estate. 99 
Samore v. Graham (In re Graham),100 is one example of a court's 
interpreting "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as not including ER­
ISA's anti-alienation provision. In Graham, the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that 
[t]he change in the scope of property of the estate effectuated by the 
new Bankruptcy Code, [and] the legislative history of § 541(c)(2) 
... convince[s] us that Congress did not intend "applicable nonban­
kruptcy law" to include ERISA. Rather, Congress only intended 
... to preserve the status [of] traditional spendthrift trusts, as recog­
101. db'y state Iaw ....mze 
The Graham court quoted extensively from the legislative history of 
section 541(c)(2), giving great weight to Senate and House references 
to "spendthrift" trustS. 102 Graham argued for a broad reading of "ap­
plicable nonbankruptcy law," one which would include ERISA's anti­
alienation provision. 103 The Graham court rejected this argument, 
99. For a list of cases in which couI"t!l held that ERISA's anti-alienation provision 
falls within the meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," see supra note 96. 
100. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). 
101. Id. at 1271. Graham, a physician and the sole officer, director, and shareholder 
in Charles W. Graham, Ltd., a professional corporation, set up a corporate profit-sharing 
retirement plan in 1970, and amended the plan to comply with ERISA in November, 1976. 
The plan had two participants, Graham and a former corporation employee, Wayne Ryan. 
Three days prior to filing for bankruptcy, Graham, in his capacity as sole director of the 
corporation, amended the terms of the plan, providing that plan benefits accrued by plan 
participants were not payable until age 65, or upon the total disability of the participant. 
The bankruptcy trustee sued Graham, asking the court to include Graham's plan assets in 
the property of his bankruptcy estate. Id. at 1269-70. ' 
102. Id. at 1271-72. While the statutory language does not mention the word' 
.. "spendthrift," the language of the House Report is clear when comparing the new and the 
old bankruptcy schemes. The report reads: 

The bill also continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the 

debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from 

creditors under applicable State law. The bankruptcy of the beneficiary should 

not be permitted to defeat the legitimate expectations of the settlor of the trust. 

H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175-76, reprinted in 1978 U,S. CODE CoNG. & 
ADMIN, NEWS 6136 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
The Senate Report also makes specific mention of a "spendthrift trust" in relation to 
the interpretation of the word "trust" in the statute. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
83, reprinted in 1978 U,S. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5869 (Section 541(c)(2) 
"preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust.") (emphasis added). 
103. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1270. Graham argued that the anti-alienation provision 
should restrict transfer of his plan interests because under previous decisions, other courts 
had used the anti-alienation provision to bar plan interest garnishment in third party judg­
ment creditor claims. Id. at 1270-71 (citing General Motors V. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th 
Cir. 1980), and Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. V. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510 
(N,D. Tex, 1981». 
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holding that because Congress expressed its intent in expanding the 
property of the debtor's estate under the Code, ERISA plan funds are 
included in the property of the debtor's estate. 104 
In Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), lOS the Federal 
District Court for the District of Kansas held that ERISA plan funds 
are excluded from the property of the debtor's estate under the terms 
of section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,l06 The Threewitt court 
reasoned that because ERISA's anti-alienation provision bars third 
party judgment creditors from reaching ERISA plan assets, the provi­
sion also bars bankruptcy creditors. 107 The Threewitt court went even 
further, however, commenting that any trust which restricts aliena­
tion, or otherwise bars any creditor from garnishing the debtor's inter­
est, is excluded from the debtor's estate. lOS 
Once a court concludes that ERISA funds are excluded from the 
property of the debtor's estate, the bankruptcy trustee must seek other 
available assets in order to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors. 
When a court decides that ERISA plan funds are not excluded from 
the debtor's estate under section 541(c)(2) of the Code, the analysis 
then turns to whether the plan interests are exempt from the debtor's 
estate under section 522(b )(2)(A).109 
2. Pension and Benefit Exemption under Section 522(b)(2)(A) 
Under section 522(b)(2)(A), a debtor is allowed to exempt prop­
erty from his or her debtor's estate under one of two exemption 
schemes. 110 The debtor can choose the federal exemptions under sec­
104. Id. at 1271. The Graham court also discussed the exemptions available under 
section 522(b)(2)(A), and concluded that ERISA plan funds were not exempt from the 
bankruptcy estate. Id. at 1274. 
105. 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982). 
106. Id. at 929. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Because Code section 522(b)(2)(A) allows exemption from the bankruptcy es­
tate of various pension plans, some courts sidestep the 541(c)(2) analysis altogether, and 
examine bankruptcy claims made against ERISA plan participants solely under section 
522(b)(2)(A). See. e.g., In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); In re Ever­
hart, 11 Bankr. 770 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86 (Bankr.' w.O. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 31 Bankr. 
139 (W.O. Wis. 1983). For examples of courts' reasoning that ERISA plan interests are 
not excluded from the debtor's estate, and a subsequent analyses of exemptions under § 
522(b)(2)(A), see Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goffv. Taylor (In re Goft),706 
F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Klayer, 20 Bankr. 270 (Bankr. w.O. Ky. 1981); In re 
Watson, 13 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). 
110. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982). Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
"Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property 
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tion 522(d) or the combination of state law exemptions and the federal 
nonbankruptcy law exemptions permitted under section 
522(b)(2)(A).111 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code allows the states 
to "opt out" of this system, forcing the debtor to proceed through 
bankruptcy using state exemptions. ll2 However, even if the debtor is 
forced to choose the state exemption scheme, the debtor still is pro­
tected by section 522(b )(2)(A), because that section provides that debt­
ors can exempt assets as permitted under state law and any federal law 
of the estate ... any property that is exempt under Federal law, ... or [s]tate or local law 
that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition ...." Id. 
Ill. Id. This comment does not discuss the exemptions available under § 522(d) of 
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 522(d) allows the debtor to exempt pension plan payments, 
ERISA as well as others, from the bankruptcy estate, up to the amount needed by plan 
participants to provide support for their families. Section 522(d) does not require courts to 
choose between ERISA provisions and policies and those of the Bankruptcy Code; it sim­
ply allows an exemption to the extent needed for support. For a broader discussion of 
§ 522(d), see Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 
N.C.L. REv. 769, 788 (1980). 
112. II U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982). "Opting out" has been a source of controversy in 
that some authors feel that the "opt out" provision gives the states too much power in 
regulating bankruptcy, an area which some argue should be left solely to federal control, 
because of the interests in having one uniform bankruptcy system. The commentators also 
raise constitutional issues surrounding the nonuniformity of this exemption system, arguing 
that allowing the states to "opt out" produces state policy that is at odds with stated federal 
policy, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause. See. e.g., Haines, Section 522's Opt-Out 
Clause: Debtors' Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1; Note, 
Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions ofSection 522: A Constitutional Challenge, 
58 IND. L.J. 143 (1982). 
Pursuant to this provision, most states have "opted out" of the federal exemption 
scheme. See. e.g., ALA. CoDE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.055 (1982); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133(B) (Supp. 1983-84); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-210 (Supp. 
1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.130 (West Supp. 1984); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-54­
107 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 4914(a) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 222.20 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CoDE ANN. § 51-1601(a) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE 
§ 11-609 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 2-1201 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-2-28-0.5 (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627-10 (West Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-2312 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 427.170 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT.. 
ANN. § 13:3881(B)(1) (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4426 (Supp. 
1984-85); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 11-504(g) (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 513.427 (Supp. 1984); MONT. CoDE ANN. § 31-2-106 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15, 
105 (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090(3) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2-a 
(1983); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 284 (Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § lC-I601(f) 
(Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. 
§ 2329.66(16) (page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § I.B (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 23.305 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-425 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-45-13 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-23-15 (Supp. 1983); VA. CoDE ANN. § 34-3.1 (1984); w. VA. CODE § 38­
10-4 (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 1-20-109 (Supp. 1984). 
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except under the exemptions in section 522(d).113 
Under section 522(b)(2)(A), the judicial inquiry centers on the 
legislative intent surrounding the section. When addressing the ex­
emption issue, courts examine the list of nonbankruptcy law exemp­
tions contained in the House and Senate Reports on the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act.114 Some courts find that the absence of ERISA on that 
list is persuasive, and hold that no exemption exists for ERISA 
funds. I IS Other courts hold that the list merely is illustrative and con­
clude that ERISA plan assets are exempted from the bankruptcy es­
tate under section 522(b)(2)(A).116 
One case in which a court held that ERISA plan assets are not 
exempt is Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff).1'17 In that case, the Golfs sought 
to have their self-employment "Keough" retirement plan excluded or 
exempted from their bankruptcy estate. I IS The Goff court, after con­
cluding that the plan assets are not excluded from the property of the 
bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2),119 analyzed the exemption 
113. 11 u.s.c. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982). A debtor may exempt "any property that is 
exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) ofthis section." Id. (emphasis added). 
114. The House and Senate reports contain identical lists of pension and benefit 
plans illustrative of property that might be exempt under federal law (other than bank­
ruptcy law). Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 1983). For a complete 
listing of exempt pension and benefit plans under this section, see S. REp. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,5861; H.R. 
REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5963, 6316. 
115. See. e.g., Goff, 706 F.2d at 583 ("The restrictive nature of the exemption listed is 
marked."); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984). After 
listing the various pension plans set out in the legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(A), 
the Graham court admitted that "[t]he legislative history provides no further indication of 
the intended scope of this provision." Id. The court went on: "While the above list was not 
meant to be exclusive, we find the failure of Congress to include ERISA plan benefits pro­
bative of Congressional intent that ERISA was not a 'Federal law' upon which a 
§ 522(b)(2)(A) exemption could be based." Id. 
116. See. e.g., In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). The Hin­
shaw court examined the anti-alienation provisions of the pension and benefit plans listed in 
the House and Senate Reports and compared them with the ERISA anti-alienation provi­
sion. Finding similar language in all of the anti-alienation provisions, the Hinshaw court· 
held that section 522(b)(2)(A) exempts ERISA plan benefits. [d. at 236. For other exam­
ples of cases in which courts held in favor of exemption, see supra note 109. 
117. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). 
118. [d. at 576. For a full description and discussion of Keough plans, see M. 
CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS 133-46 (1977 & West Supp. 1982). In general, a 
Keough plan is an ERISA-qualified retirement or profit-sharing plan which is set up and 
administered by self-employed persons for their own bc;nefit. [d. 
119. Goff, 706 F.2d at 582 ("[I]t is clear that Congress intended ... to exempt from 
the estate only those 'spendthrift trusts' traditionally beyond the reach of creditors under 
state law."). 
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provisions of section 522(b)(2)(A).120 In addition to examining the list 
of nonbankruptcy law exemptions in the legislative history, and noting 
the absence of ERISA on that list,121 the court compared two conflict­
ing bankruptcy court decisions on this issue. 122 This analysis led the 
court to the conclusion that congressional failure to include ERISA on 
the list of exemptions was evidence that Congress did not intend the 
exemptions provided in section 522(b )(2)(A) to apply to ERISA plan 
assets. 123 
In contrast to Goff and Graham, the court in In re Hinshaw 124 
allowed the ERISA plan participant to exempt plan assets from the 
bankruptcy estate. 125 The Hinshaw court bypassed the 541(c )(2) anal­
ysis, accepting the proposition that the anti-alienation provision did 
not exclude ERISA plan assets from the debtor's estate as an enforcea­
ble restriction on a trust, and focused instead on the section 
522(b)(2)(A) exemptions. 126 In analyzing the exemptions, the Hin­
shaw court examined the list of nonbankruptcy exemptions listed in 
the legislative history of 522(b )(2)(A), and concluded that "the simi­
larity between the provisions of those statutes that are recognized as 
constituting a federal exemption and the provisions of .. '. [ERISA's 
anti-alienation provision] supports a conclusion that a federal exemp­
tion for ERISA plans was intended."127 The Hinshaw court reasoned 
that because ERISA's anti-alienation provision contained the same 
limitation on assignment and alienation as the anti-alienation provi­
sions of the statutes listed in the legislative history of section 
522(b)(2)(A), Congress intended the list to include ERISA plans. 128 
These cases illustrate the different approaches and views that 
courts take when examining the issue of exempting ERISA plan assets 
120. Id. 
121. See supra note 114. 
122. Goff, 706 F.2d at 583. The Goff court compared the reasoning in Samore v. 
Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) (no exemption under 
522(b)(2)(A», with that in In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (ERISA 
plan funds exempt under 522(b)(2)(A». 
123. Goff, 706 F.2d at 585 ("Certainly, therefore, Congress did not 'overlook' ER­
ISA. Given the extensive and general reach of ERISA-qualified plans, it is highly improba­
ble that Congress intended their inclusion without mention in the Section 522(b)(2)(A) 
exemption in the midst of a listing of significantly less comprehensive and less well known 
statutes. "). 
124. 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). 
125. Id. at 235-36. 
126. Id. at 234. For. a discussion of the 541(c)(2) exclusion, see supra notes 94-109 
and accompanying text. 
127. Id. at 235. 
128. Id. at 235-36. 
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from the debtor's estate. The differing interpretations and analyses oc­
cur because of the inexplicit language and legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The recent trend of courts is to allow ERISA plan 
interests to be garnished by the bankruptcy trustee, thereby recogniz­
ing an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 129 The courts 
inferred the bankruptcy exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provi­
sion, and the exception remains exclusively judicial. There are obvi­
ous conflicts between ERISA policy and the policies and provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code, conflicts which have been discussed by various 
authors. 130 The questions of interpretation will remain, however, until 
Congress amends ERISA to either allow for garnishment of plan inter­
ests in bankruptcy claims, or includes ERISA on the list of federal 
nonbankruptcy exemptions. 131 Some courts also have interpreted ER­
ISA's anti-alienation provision to permit another exception~ne to 
remedy damage caused by fraud on the part of a plan participant or 
fiduciary. Similar to the bankruptcy exception, the propriety of this 
exception is in dispute. The focus of this comment now turns to an 
analysis of this dispute. 
III. JUDICIALLY IMPLIED FRAUD EXCEPTION 
The issue of an implied fraud exception to ERISA's anti-aliena­
tion provision arises when a fiduciary or an employee. who also is a 
pension or benefit plan participant, either defrauds· or embezzles plan 
129. See. e.g., Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 
1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor 
(In re Goft), 706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1983); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In 
re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). 
130. This comment is not intended to provide an in-depth discussion of the policy 
conflicts between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. The focus of the comment is on ex­
ceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. Creditor claims against an ERISA plan par­
ticipant's plan interest provide one example of an implied exception. For a broader 
discussion of the Bankruptcy Code and conflicts with ERISA policy, see Seiden, Chapter 7 
Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's Interest in or 
Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can Be Used to Pay Claims?, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 219 
(1987); Wohl, Pension and Bankruptcy Laws: A Clash ofSocial Policies, 64 N.C.L. REV. 3 
(1985); Note, Exemption ofERISA Benefits under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 83 MICH. L. REV. 214 (1984); Note, Contra Goff: Of Retirement Trusts and Bank­
ruptcy Code § 541(c)(2), 32 UCLA L. REV. 1266 (1985). 
131. Some commentators focus on pension fund control as determinative of whether 
a court will allow an exception for bankruptcy. See Seiden, supra at note 130, at 251 (dis­
cussing plan participants that have self-settled trusts qualified under ERISA). Professor 
Seiden discusses, in detail, the background and implications of the bankruptcy exception 
issue, and concludes that "[j]udicial or legislative clarification is required now so that the 
Internal Revenue Code, ERISA, and the Bankruptcy Code can be interpreted consist­
ently...." Id. at 240. 
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funds, or embezzles funds from the employer who contributes to an 
ERISA plan for the benefit of the employees. The other plan partici­
pants, or the employer, seek to recover their loss by attempting to gar­
nish the wrongdoer's plan assets, usually after obtaining a civil 
judgment against the wrongdoer. l32 The wrongdoer, or the plan ad­
ministrators, attempt to block the garnishment by arguing that ER­
ISA's anti-alienation provision prohibits the alienation of plan funds, 
regardless of the conduct of the wrongdoer or fiduciary.l33 
In one line of cases, courts have found an implied exception to 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision based on traditional trust law prin­
ciples found in ERISA.l34 In another line of cases, courts have held 
that no fraud exception exists, reading ERISA's anti-alienation provi­
sion and the entire statute narrowly.l3S 
The most recent illustrations of these divergent lines of cases are 
found in two recent United States Court of Appeals decisions. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
concluded that an implied exception to the anti-alienation provision 
does exist in cases involving fiduciary fraud,136 while the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that there was no implied exception for em­
ployee fraud. l37 
A. Crawford v; La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd.138 
La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd. was a corporation owned and oper­
ated by Bernard Goldstein. Bernard's brother, Jack Goldstein, 
worked for La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd. and for District Hotel Supply, 
Inc., another corporation owned and operated by Bernard Goldstein. 
District Hotel Supply, Inc. maintained a profit-sharing plan for the 
benefit of its employees, and both Jack and Bernard Goldstein were 
plan participants and trustees. 
132. See, e.g., Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 118 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987), reh'gdenied, 108 S. Ct. 735 (1988); United Metal 
Prod. Corp. v. National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297,298-99 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988). 
133. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119; United Metal, 811 F.2d at 298. 
134. See, e.g., Crawford, 815 F.2d at 120. See also St. Paul Fire and ;Marine Ins. Co. 
v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir. 1985); Guidry v. National Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l 
Pension Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Colo. 1986). 
135. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299, 300. See also Ellis Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. 
Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 469-71 (2d Cir. 1986); Yink v. SHY North Am. Holding 
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
136. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 120. 
137. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 300. 
138. 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987), reh'g denied, 
108 S. Ct. 735 (1988). 
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Among his other holdings, Bernard Goldstein was a principal in a 
real estate purchasing partnership named BRIL Associates. Gold­
stein's partners in BRIL Associates were his wife and children. Ber­
nard and Jack Goldstein diverted $461,000.00 of District Hotel 
Supply profit-sharing plan funds to BRIL Associates, and transferred 
another $163,000.00 to La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd. At various times, 
the Goldsteins used plan money to pay their taxes, and for other pri­
vate uses. No provision for repayment of the funds was ever made, 
and in fact, the funds have not been repaid. 139 
. Fifteen plan participants brought suit in the United States Dis­
trict Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the Goldsteins 
misused plan funds, violating an ERISA fiduciary obligation. 14O On 
their motion for summary judgment, the court ruled for the plan par­
ticipants. The court also found the Goldsteins jointly and severally 
liable, and awarded the plan participants $976,822.38 in damages. 141 
Additionally, Bernard Goldstein was held personally liable in the 
amount of $20,999.00. 142 The Goldsteins failed to pay the judgment, 
and the court, on motion from the plan participants, garnished the 
Goldsteins' interests in the plan. 143 The Goldsteins appealed, claiming 
that ERISA's anti-alienation provision prohibited the garnishment. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
held that notwithstanding the anti-alienation provision, the Gold­
steins' plan assets were subject to garnishment. l44 In its analysis, the 
Crawford court focused on the trust language in ERISA's legislative 
history.145 Citing the Senate Report, the Crawford court concluded 
that Congress "made clear the congressional direction to the federal 
courts to draw on principles of traditional trust law." 146 As trustees of 
the plan, the court held the Goldsteins accountable on the basis of 
ERISA's fiduciary standards and standards of traditional trust law. 
The trust law standards indicated that courts could use the trust inter­
ests of the fiduciary in order to offset the loss to the plan. 147 The 
139. Id. at 118. 




144. Id. at 120. 
145. Id. at 119-20. ERISA provides that all ERISA-qualified funds are held in trust. 
29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982 & Supp. II. 1984). 
146. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 120. 
147. Id. The court discussed two authorities on the law of trusts. Both authorities 
agreed that a trustee's interest in a trust could be garnished by the beneficiaries harmed by 
the trustee's wrongful conduct. Id. (citing G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 191, at 
484 (3d ed. 1979); III SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 257, at 2201 (3d ed. 1967». 
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Crawford court rejected the strict reading of the anti-alienation provi­
sion suggested by the Goidsteins, and indicated that the existing ex­
ception for domestic relations shows that the anti-alienation provision 
should not be "regarded as immutable."148 
In support of an implied. exception for fraud, the Crawford court 
cited St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. COX.t49 In that case, 
Cox, a bank president, misapplied bank funds, and the plaintiff-insurer 
paid the bank $152,000.00 pursuant to its insurance contract. 1SO 
Under the terms of the insurance policy, St. Paul retained a subroga­
tion right against Cox, and sought to garnish Cox's interest in the 
bank's profit-sharing plan. lSI The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that St. Paul was entitled to Cox's interest in the plan, reasoning 
that "a wrongdoer shoUld not benefit from his misdeeds."ls2 . Refer­
ring to ERISA, the Cox court stated: "The legislation provides no 
indication whatsoever that it is intended to protect the employee 
against the consequences of his own misdeeds ... [and] [t]here is no 
reason to conclude. that ERISA requires the abrogation of the equita­
ble principle that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his 
misdeeds."ls3 
The Crawford court found the Cox reasoning to be persuasive. 
Relying on its own reading of ERISA, the statute's legislative history, 
and the Cox reasoning, it concluded that the plan participants could 
garnish the Goldsteins' interests in the profit-sharing plan. 154 The 
Crawford decision stands in contrast to a decision by the Court of Ap­
peals for the Sixth Circuit, in which that court refused to infer a fraud 
exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 
148. Id. at 121. The Goldsteins argued for a restrictive construction of the statute, 
citing General Motors v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 1980). The Buha court ad­
dressed the question of whether ERISA pension and benefit plan funds could be garnished 
by a tort judgment creditor. [d. at 457. The Buha court examined ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision, and the correSponding treasury regulation concerning alienation of pension ben­
efits, and concluded that these anti-alienation provisions prohibited any voluntary or invol­
untary attachment or assignment. Id. at 460-63 (emphasis added). 
149. 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985). 
150. [d. at 551. 
151. Id. 
152. [d. at 552. 
153. [d. 
154. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 122. Another example of a court's inferring a fraud ex­
ception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision is Guidry v. National Sheet Metal Workers 
Nat'l Pension Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360,363 (D. Colo. 1986). The Guidry court imposed a 
constructive trust in favor of plan participants on the accrued pension benefits of a plan 
participant who embezzled plan funds. Id. 
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B. United Metal Products Corp. v. National Bank-of Detroit lSS 
In United Metal Products Corp. v. National Bcmk of Detroit, the 
United Metal Products Corp. sued to garnish an employee's interest in 
the company profit-sharing plan, attempting to recover a loss due to 
the employee's embezzlement of company funds. Blandina Coelho, 
the company bookkeeper and participant in the company's profit-shar­
ing plan, embezzled $441,408.72 of company funds and disappeared. 
After obtaining a judgment in absentia against Ms. Coelho, the com­
pany moved to garnish her interest in· the profit-sharing plan. The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan de~ 
nied the requested relief, holding that there was no express or implied 
fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ·affirmed, holding that 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision does not allow garnishment of plan 
assets, even in cases of fraud or criminal conduct. 1S6 
In analyzing the statute, the United Metal court found the mean­
ing of the anti-alienation provision to be self-evident.ls7 Accordingly, 
the United Metal court reasoned that a literal reading of the statute 
was required unless the resulting decision would cause "results so 
manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be attriJ>uted to 
congressional design."ls8 The court examined ERISA in terms of the 
stated congressional purpose to protect the worker and his family, and 
concluded that Congress intended that "stability and certainty of pen­
sion and profit sharing plans ... are important and legitimate goals of 
ERISA."ls9 Thus, the court reasoned that a holding which refused to 
recognize an implied fraud exception would be consistent with con­
gressional design. 160 The United Metal court distinguished the domes­
tic relations exception from the fraud exception by pointing out that 
domestic relations is an area that is within the state's police power, 
155. 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988). 
156. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 298-99. While it is true that Ms. Coelho embezzled 
funds from her employer, and not from the profit-sharing plan as in Crawford, the United 
Metal majority pointed out that Ms. Coelho's criminal actions could have affected the prof­
itability of the company, and thereby on the other plan participants. "Coelho's criminal 





160. Id. The court stated that finding in favor of an implied fraud exception, and 
thereby allowing garnishment, could deprive plan participants' families of pension or profit­
sharing benefits. The court claimed that this would undermine the congressional objectives 
of insuring receipt of benefits by participants and their families. Id. 
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and as such, is given deference when at odds with the terms of a fed­
eral statute. 161 
In reviewing precedent, the United Metal court found the reason­
ing of Vink v. SHV North American Holding Corp. 162 to be persua­
sive. 163 The Vink court held that an implied fraud exception to the 
anti-alienation provision would violate congressional intent,l64 and ex­
pressed four areas of concern, all of which were reaffirmed by the 
United Metal court.16S 
First, the Vink court distinguished the domestic relations excep­
tion based on necessary deference to the states' exercise of their police 
power. 166 Second, the court expressed concern for the families of 
"faithless employees" who would lose the accrued pension benefits if 
an exception for fraud or criminal conduct was allowed. 167 Because 
stated congressional intent was to protect employees and their benefi­
ciaries, such an outcome would be inconsistent with the statute's pur­
pose. 168 Third, the court considered the fact that amicus briefs filed by 
the Labor and Treasury Departments in an earlier fraud exception 
case were opposed to the idea of a fraud or criminal conduct excep­
tion. 169 Lastly, the Vink court found no precedent which favored a 
161. id. at 299. For a discussion of one court's reasoning on the "police power" 
issue, see note 60 and accompanying text. 
162. 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Vink, the plaintiff was the president of an 
SHY subsidiary company when he was dismissed because of his illegal activities. Vink 
pleaded guilty to mail fraud, accepting kickbacks, and bribery, and was sentenced to four­
teen months in prison. Upon his release he sought pension benefits from SHY. SHY re­
fused payment of the. benefits, alleging that Vink had forfeited his right to pension benefits 
through his illegal activities. The Vink court construed ERISA's anti-alienation provision 
narrowly, and Vink prevailed. Id. at 269. 
163. United Metal, 811 F.2d at .299. The court also referred to the holding of Ellis 
Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986). In Ellis, Sam 
Kalil, Jr., committed theft and securities fraud while employed by Bache Group, Inc. Kalil 
was a participant in the ERISA-qualified Bache employee savings plan. The Ellis National 
Bank, damaged by Kalil's illegal activities, obtained two civil judgments against him. Kalil 
assigned his benefits in the plan to the bank in order to satisfy the judgments, and Bache 
sued to block the assignment, asserting its subrogation right against Kalil based upon 
Bache's payments to Kalil's defrauded customers. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that Kalil's benefits were not assignable under ERISA's anti-alienation provi­
sion. Id. at 467-68. 
164. Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 271. 
165. Id.; United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299. 
166. Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 271. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 271-72. The government's position on the fraud exception differs from its 
position on the domestic relations exception. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
The amicus briefs cited by the Vink court were filed by the Labor and Treasury Depart­
ments in relation to another fraud exception case, Winer v. Edison Bros. Stores Pension 
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fraud exception.l'° 
The United Metal court found the Vink reasoning persuasive. 
The plaintiff in United Metal relied on the Cox reasoning,111 but the 
court declined to follow that case. The court did, however, acknowl­
edge the equitable appeal of the plaintiff's position,172 but refused to 
infer a fraud exception, stating: "[W]hether an exception should be 
created is a question for legislative rather than judicial judgment." 173 
Citing fear of" 'a boundless stream of suits and disputes' "174 which 
might result if it did follow Cox, the United Metal court stated: "[W]e 
can conceive of countless factual situations that would present equally 
persuasive opportunities to create exceptions to the anti-alienation 
laws."17s 
The Crawford and United Metal decisions examined the accepta-
Plan, 593 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979). In Winer, two company salesmen were fired after their 
employer discovered that they had received improper payments from company suppliers. 
These payments totalled between $40,000.00 and $60,000.00 per person over a twenty year 
period. In addition to the payments, the salesmen's children received payments, and the 
salesmen took vacations paid for by a company supplier. The employer dismissed the sales­
men, and refused to provide pension benefits under its pension plan. The employer argued 
that under the terms of its "bad boy" clause in the pension plan, it could deny pension 
payments to these employees. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appea1s disagreed, holding that 
ERISA (which was enacted subsequent to the salesmen's receipt of the improper payments) 
prohibited enforcement of the "bad boy" clause. Id. at 311. 
The Labor and Treasury Departments each filed an amicus brief, urging the court to 
interpret ERISA's anti-alienation provision as prohibiting the denial of pension benefits, 
even in cases of employees receiving illegal kickbacks. Id. at 312. 
170. The Vink court pointed out that in previous domestic relations cases, courts 
favoring an implied exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision had "an abundance of 
precedent[] to buttress [their] conclusions." Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 272. The court found 
that the only case which supported a fraud exception had been overturned. Id. (citing 
National Bank of N. Am. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loca1 3, Pension and 
Vacation Funds, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2d Dep't) (1978), appeal dismissed as 
moot, 48 N.Y.2d 752,397 N.E.2d 1333,422 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1979). The National Bank case 
was disapproved expressly by the New York State Court of Appea1s in Helmsley-Spear, 
Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 419 
N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981). 
171. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 300. For a discussion of Cox, see supra notes 149-53 
and accompanying text. 
172. The court stated: "We recognize that plaintiff has presented an almost ideal 
case for creation of an implied exception to pension anti-alienation laws." United Metal, 
811 F.2d at 300. 
173. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979». 
174. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 300 (quoting Ellis Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Ir­
ving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 471 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Vink v. SHY North America 
Holding Co., 549 F. Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982»). 
175. Id. The court does not describe any of the "countless factual situations" to 
which it refers. However, the court does acknowledge that the facts in United Metal pro­
vide "an almost ideal case for creation of an implied exception to pension anti-alienation 
laws." Id. at 300. A similar statement is found in Vink, where the court said: "[I]t appears 
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bility of an implied fraud exception and came to different conclusions. 
Each court cited relevant precedent and ERISA's legislative history, 
and each reasoned that its decision was proper based on those factors. 
The next section of this comment analyzes the differences between the 
decisions, and then proposes that Congress amend ERISA's anti-alien­
ation provision to provide for a narrow fraud exception. 
C. Crawford and United Metal-What's the Real Difference? 
The factual circumstances in Crawford and United Metal are 
analogous in many respects. ERISA plan participants, or employers 
who provide employees with ERISA-qualified plans, sought to recover 
monies either taken from the plan itself, or embezzled from the em­
ployer who supports the plan. The participants, or the employer, seek 
to garnish the wrongdoer's plan interests as an offset of their own loss. 
In light of the different outcome reached by each court, the factual 
similarities highlight the issue of why the courts came to different con­
clusions. Analyzing the decisions indicates two areas of conflict. 
1. Fiduciary Status 
The first, and most obvious conflict is the status of the wrongdoer 
in each case. The Goldsteins were fiduciaries to the profit-sharing 
plan, as well as plan participants,l16 In discussing ERISA's fiduciary 
duties, the Crawford court initially examined the fiduciary standard of 
care and the liability for breaching that fiduciary duty.177 The court 
then reasoned, based on ERISA's legislative history, that it could con­
duct a broad inquiry into trust principles, in order to adequately pro­
tect plan participants. 178 The employment of traditional trust 
that if ever there were a case to carve out a 'fraud' exception to ERISA's ... [anti-aliena­
tion] provision[], this might be such a case." Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273. 
The dissent in United Metal criticized the majority's narrow reading of ERISA. 
Agreeing with the Cox holding, the dissent would have allowed garnishment of Ms. 
Coelho's pension plan assets. In reaching this result, the dissent stressed the fact that Con­
gress also intended to protect other plan participants. Disagreeing with the majority's fear 
of floodgate exceptions, the dissent reasoned that a narrow exception on these facts would 
not "produce the conjured 'boundless stream of suits and disputes,' " and, therefore, 
adopted the rule of the Cox decision. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 301 (Wellford, C.J., dis­
senting) (quoting Vink v. SHV North America Holding Co., 549 F. Supp. 268, 273 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982». 
176. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 118. 
177. Id. at 119. The court pointed out that under ERISA, a fiduciary "shall be per­
sonally liable" for any losses sustained by a plan, when the losses result from a breach of a 
fiduciary duty. Id. For a discussion of ERISA's fiduciary provisions, see supra notes 25-39 
and accompanying text. 
178. [d. at 119-20. The court held that it had broad remedial authority when com­
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principles led the court to conclude that the Goldsteins' plan interests 
were subject to garnishment by other plan participants. 179 The wrong­
doer in United Metal was a company bookkeeper, and a participant in 
the company profit-sharing plan. ISO Unlike Crawford, the United 
Metal majority did not examine ERISA's fiduciary provisions. Rather 
than broadening its inquiry into the' equity and trust principles con­
tained in ERISA's legislative history, the United Metal majority fo­
cused solely on the anti-alienation provision. lSI This allowed the 
court to ignore ERISA's legislative history, and the trust principles 
therein, and to hold that Ms. Coelho's plan assets were not subject to 
garnishment, despite the damage that she caused to the employer and 
to the plan by her fraudulent and illegal acts. lS2 The difference in 
wrongdoer status is important because the presence of plan fiduciaries 
in Crawford eventually led the court to apply traditional trust princi­
ples to the facts of the employee's claim. lS3 The United Metal major­
ity did not examine these principles presumably because it believed 
that Ms. Coelho was not a plan fiduciary.l84 
pensating for a breach of a fiduciary duty. The court cited the Senate Report on ERISA, 
specifically the portions that discuss ERISA's enforcement provisions, in order to justify its 
examination of trust principles. Id. at 120. 
The legislative history discussed by the Crawford court outlines congressional intent to 
allow plan participants a ',/ul/ range oflegal and equitable remedies" when seeking redress 
for violations of fiduciary duties. Id. (S. REp. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 
1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639,4838,4871). The court also discussed the 
report of Senate Committee Chairman Harrison Williams, Jr., who stated: "'The objec­
tives of these [fiduciary] provisions are to make applicable the law of trusts.' " Id. (quoting 
120 CoNG. REc. S-15,737 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
5177,5186). See also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462 (10th Cir: 1978); St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir. 1985). 
179. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 120. The court reasoned that allowing the garnishment 
of the Goldsteins' plan assets was consistent with ERISA fiduciary policy enforcement and 
reinforced ERISA's traditional trust principles. Id. 
180. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 298. Although Ms. Coelho, as company bookkeeper, 
arguably could be considered a fiduciary to the company, she does not fall within ERISA's 
fiduciary provisions, and, thus, is not a fiduciary to her fellow plan participants. One au­
thor asserts that non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate and aid in fiduciary breaches 
involving ERISA plans should be liable to the plan for its losses. See, e.g., Schwartz, Non­
Fiduciary Liability Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 69 MARQ. L. 
REv. 561, 564 (1986). 
181. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299-300. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, 
see supra notes 156-74 and accompanying text. 
182. Id. at 300. 
183. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 120. 
184. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299-300. The United Metal majority did not discuss 
ERISA's fiduciary provisions ~pecifically. However, the dissent adopted the Cox reasoning, 
which upheld the separate equitable principle that wrongdoers not be allowed to benefit 
from their wrong. Id. at 301 (Wellford, C.J., dissenting). 
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2. ERISA Construction 
The second area of conflict between the two decisions centers on 
statutory construction. Both courts recognized ERISA's basic goal of 
plan participant protection. 18s However, analyzing the two decisions 
shows that the Crawford court analyzed ERISA's provisions in a gen­
eral, policy-oriented manner, 186 while United Metal focused almost ex­
clusively on the language of the anti-alienation provision. 187 
United Metal read the anti-alienation provision literally, making 
an exception "[o]nly when a literal construction ora statute yields re­
suits ... [that are] manifestly unreasonable."188 Discussing the do­
mestic relations exception, the majority agreed with the Vink court, 
that the implied domestic relations exception falls within a state's po­
lice power, and its existence illustrated judicial deference to the con­
gressional intent of protecting workers' families. 189 The United Metal 
185. Crawford, 81~ F.2d at 119-20; United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299. 
186. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119-21. 
187. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299. The majority only cited ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision and a similar provision contained in Section 7.7 of the United Metal profit-shar­
ing plan. Id. 
188. Id. at 300. The United Metal court simply set forth the language of the anti­
alienation provision and moved on to the arguments of the parties, without examining ER­
ISA's background or legislative history. Id. at 299. One possible explanation for the 
court's reluctance to examine ERISA's legislative history may be the "plain meaning" rule 
of statutory construction. 
The plain meaning rule provides: "If the words [of the statute] convey a definite 
meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the instru­
ment, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, must be accepted . . .." 
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 229 (1975) (cit­
ing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889». For further discussion of the plain 
meaning rule, see SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION 681, 681-82, 794 
(Sands 4th ed. 1986)(volume 3); R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Appeals in Federal Courts by Prose­
cuting Entities Other than the United States: The Plain Meaning Rule Revisited, 33 HAS­
TINGS L.J. 187, 207-39 (1981). 
However, the United Metal court's application of the plain meaning rule is questiona­
ble. A part of the plain meaning rule involves an examination of whether the particular 
provision contradicts other parts of the statute. Therefore, the proper interpretation of the 
anti-alienation provision would have to include an examination of the purposes and intent 
behind ERISA, in order to be consistent with both the plain meaning rule and the "whole 
statute" statutory interpretation rule. This rule provides that: "'An instrument must al­
ways be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or 
phrase is usually to be ascnbed from the context, the nature of the subject matter ... and 
the purpose or intention of ... the body which enacted ... the statute ... .''' Singer, supra 
volume 2A, at 90, (citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944». 
For further discussion of the whole statute interpretation rule, see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. 
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975). 
189. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299. The majority contrasted the domestic relations 
exception with the fraud exception by making this "police power" distinction. Id. The 
majority reasoned that "the refusal to allow an employer to retain vested pension benefits of 
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court thus viewed the domestic relations exception' as only providing 
family protection, and not as indicating that ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision is subject to implied exceptions.l90 
The Crawford court viewed the anti-alienation provision as a 
somewhat more flexible provision. 191 The court examined both the 
domestic relations exception and ERISA's overall goals, and con­
cluded that exceptions to the anti-alienation provision could be made, 
so long as the exception furthered ERISA's stated congressional in­
tent. 192 The Crawford court read ERISA as a whole, not just focusing 
on the language of the anti-alienation provision. This reading enabled 
the Crawford court to give greater effect to the congressional intent of 
protecting all plan participants and their beneficiaries. The court rea­
soned that a restrictive reading of the anti-alienation provision, and of 
ERISA policy, would not only undermine the protections intended by 
Congress, but would lead to the wrongdoer's unjust enrichment. 193 
In contrast, the United Metal court's reading of congressional 
policy focused on the beneficiaries of the one plan participant who was 
accused of wrongdoing, and the court chose to protect those persons, 
rather than protecting all plan participants. The United Metal major­
ity concluded with two concerns about an implied exception to ER­
ISA's anti-alienation provision. First, the majority stated its fear of 
an employee ... convicted of fraudulent activity [while] in the course of his employment 
does not usurp any state function." Id. (citing Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 271). 
190. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 299 (citing Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 271). The United 
Metal court's reasoning on this point is unpersuasive. The language of the anti-alienation 
provision seems unequivocal in prohibiting alienation of ERISA plan benefits. It was be­
cause of this seemingly unequivocal language that courts had to infer the domestic relations 
exception. The fact that Congress sanctioned this exception bolsters the proposition that 
the anti-alienation provision, indeed, is subject to exception. Without an exception, judicial 
or legislative, there could be no alienation of benefits for domestic relations support claims. 
Thus, although the United Metal court could assert that the only exception to the anti­
alienation provision should be the domestic relations exception, it is illogical to assert that. 
the provision is not subject to exception. 
191. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 121 ("The anti-alienation rule has not been regarded as 
immutable .... [because] various decisions have implied a limited exception [to the 
rule] ...."). 
192. While examining precedent, the Crawford court stated: "Of prime importance 
to the courts in considering implied exceptions to the non-alienation provisions have been 
the congressional objectives behind ERISA, and the effect of the proposed exceptions on 
those goals." Crawford, 815 F.2d at 121 (quoting Cox, 752 F.2d at 552 (citing AT&T v. 
Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 120-25 (2d Cir. 1979); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154­
56 (S.D.N.Y. 1978))). 
193. Id. ("A contrary interpretation [of ERISA's anti-alienation provision) would 
permit trustee wrongdoers to benefit from their misdeeds ...."). The court explained that 
in Crawford, the Goldsteins owned over sixty percent of the interest in the plan. If the plan 
went into receivership as a result of their fiduciary breaches, the receiver might be forced to 
include the Goldsteins in the distribution of plan assets. Id. at 121-22. 
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floodgate litigation over the exception,194 and second, it concluded 
that the question of whether an implied exception should be created is 
better left to the legislature, and not the courts,19S In response to 
those concerns, and others raised by the two decisions, the next section 
of this comment· proposes a statutory amendment model which pro­
vides a narrow fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 
IV. PROPOSED ERISA FRAUD EXCEPTION AMENDMENT 
Since ERISA's enactment, courts have examined its anti-aliena­
tion provision in various contexts, and have inferred exceptions in the 
areas of domestic relations, bankruptcy, and fraud. These exceptions 
are based. upon the courts' readings of expressed or implied congres­
sional intent. The domestic relations exception was inferred judicially, 
but eventually codified in 1984,196 The bankruptcy exception remains 
a creature of judicial inference, with a majority of courts reasoning 
that ERISA plan interests are included in the debtor's estate. 197 Con­
gress acted on the domestic relations exception through an amend­
ment to the anti-alienation provision, but has not acted on the 
bankruptcy exception. Arguably, there remains a conflict over the 
bankruptcy exception, and it is therefore imperative that any excep­
tion to the anti-alienation provision be codified in order to avoid the 
potential conflicts over statutory interpretation. 198 
194. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 300 ("[W]e can conceive of countless factual situa­
tions that would present equally persuasive opportunities to create exceptions to the anti­
alienation laws."). The dissent disagreed, arguing that a narrow exception could better 
serve ERISA policy without opening a flood of new litigation. Id. at 301 (Wellford, C.l., 
dissenting). 
195. Id. at 300 (quoting U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979». While argu­
ing that a fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provison weakens the effectiveness of 
ERISA's preemption provision, one author also notes that exceptions to ERISA should be 
left to the legislature..See Note, infra at note 204. 
196. See supra notes 48-77 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 79-131 and accompanying text. 
198. When courts infer exceptions to statutory provisions, questions of statutory in­
terpretation arise. Discussing statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he 
starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly 
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive." Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). See also North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983); American To­
bacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). 
Congress clearly has spoken on the issue of plan fund alienation for domestic relations 
support orders. However, Congress has yet to act on the issue of plan fund alienation in 
bankruptcy. In light of explicit congressional approval of the domestic relations exception, 
opponents of the bankruptcy exception could assert that congressional silence indicates 
disapproval of the bankruptcy exception. In order to prevent any judicial disagreement 
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A. Amendment Policy 
Examining ERISA policy and legislative history demonstrates 
that the Crawford court made the proper inquiry into the congres­
sional intent behind ERISA's enactment. The Crawford court ex­
amined ERISA as an entire statute, including its legislative history 
and purpose, and concluded that Congress intended to protect all plan 
participants and their beneficiaries. 199 The court refused to protect the 
interests of a wrongdoer at the expense of other plan participants, and 
agreed with the Cox reasoning, that there is no indication that ER­
ISA's anti-alienation provision was intended to be used as a shield by 
those who commit fraud against an ERISA plan.2°O The purpose of 
protecting plan participants is undermined when plan participants are 
not permitted to garnish the plan interests of those who defraud or 
embezzle from pension and benefit plans, or who place plan funds at 
risk by embezzling from employers who maintain ERISA plans. The 
decisions in United Metal and Vink cannot be squared with the general 
policy concerns that led to ERISA. These decisions rejected an im­
plied fraud exception in favor of protecting the interests of the wrong­
doer. The policy of this amendment is to provide greater protection to 
all plan participants and their beneficiaries by providing a means by 
which other plan participants, or the employer who administers the 
ERISA plan, may recover some of the loss to the plan caused by the 
wrongdoer's fraud or fiduciary breach. 
B. Scope of the Amendment 
The proposed amendment would be added to the anti-alienation 
provision201 where the codified domestic relations exception is con­
tained. The scope of the amendment extends participant protection 
beyond that provided against third party/commercial judgment credi­
tors in General Motors v. Buha.202 In Buha, tort judgment creditors 
were not permitted to garnish the plan interests of an ERISA plan 
participant. The Buha court held that the anti-alienation provision, in 
the case of third party judgment creditors, prohibits all voluntary or 
over the interpretation of the fraud exception, this comment advocates a model fraud 
amendment to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 
199. See supra notes 138-154 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Crawford 
decision. For a discussion of the "whole statute" statutory interpretation rule, see supra 
note 189. 
200. For a discussion of the Cox reasoning, see supra notes 149-54 and accompany­
ing text. 
201. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
202. 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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involuntary encroachments on the ERISA plan participant's plan in­
terests.203 Under the amendment, a wrongdoer who defrauds or em­
bezzles from an ERISA plan, or from an employer who maintains an 
ERISA plan for the benefit of the employees, may have his or her plan 
interests garnished pursuant to a civil or criminal court judgment 
which is within the parameters of the amendment. Additionally, con­
sistent with the Crawford decision, any plan fiduciary who breaches a 
fiduciary duty, when that breach causes a loss either; (1) to the em­
ployer, the loss threatening continuation of the plan, or (2) to the plan 
itself, shall have his or her plan interests subject to garnishment under 
this amendment. 
The scope of this amendment is intended to encompass all parties 
with vested benefits in an ERISA-qualified plan. This includes plan 
participants and fiduciaries whose wrongful conduct has a detrimental 
effect on the plan and its participants. 
C. Text of the Amendment 
The language of the proposed amendment states: 
(1) Subject to Paragraph (3) of this amendment; 
(A) Paragraph (1) of this section shall not apply to the assign­
ment, attachment, alienation, or garnishment, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, of the plan interests of a plan participant or fiduciary 
who: 
(i) embezzles from, defrauds, breaches a fiduciary duty to, or 
otherwise causes an economic loss to a plan qualified under this 
Chapter, or 
(ii) embezzles from, defrauds, breaches a fiduciary duty to, or 
causes an economic loss to an employer who is maintaining a quali­
fied plan for the benefit of the employees, where that embezzlement 
or fraud or fiduciary breach causes an economic loss to the plan 
maintained by the employer, and thereby, to plan participants. 
(a) The employer, in order to show that the wrongdoer's ac­
tions· caused a loss to the plan or to plan participants, must show 
that those actions jeopardize the continuation of the employer's 
contributions to, and maintenance of the plan. The evidence must 
show that the employer has been affected by the wrongdoer's ac­
tions to an extent that the employer: 
(i) is forced into bankruptcy; 
(ii) is no longer able to contribute to or maintain an ERISA plan; 
or 
203.' Id. at 463. 
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(iii) is forced to reduce the contributions to the ERISA plan to the 
extent that there is a reduction in benefits to plan participants. 
(C) A criminal conviction of the wrongdoer, in a criminal action 
arising from the illegal activity against the plan or the contributing 
employer, presents a rebuttable presumption in favor of alienation. 
Alternatively, a civil judgment against a wrongdoer arising from the 
activity against the plan or the contributing employer presents the 
same rebuttable presumption in favor of alienation. 
(2) A civil court must apply a standard of clear and convincing 
evidence to any claim or action made under this amendment. 
(3) Notwithstanding Paragraph (1) of this amendment; 
(A) All other attachable or garnishable interests of the wrongdoer 
shall become subject to attachment or garnishment prior to the at­
tachment or garnishment of the wrongdoer's ERISA plan interests. 
D. Application of the Amendment 
This model amendment provides the narrow exception required 
in cases of plan participant or fiduciary fraud. The general policy and 
legislative intent of protecting all plan participants is reinforced by the 
model amendment. Plan participants continue to be protected from 
garnishment by third party judgment creditors, while their protection 
from those who defraud or embezzle to the detriment of the plan is 
increased. 
Both Crawford and United Metal provide examples of cases in 
which the fraud amendment would apply. In United Metal, the em­
ployee/plan participant embezzled company funds and the company 
obtained a civil judgment against her. Under this amendment, in a 
garnishment action subsequent to the civil judgment, the company 
must prove that the wrongdoer has no other garnishable assets, or that 
the assets are inadequate to compensate the loss. The company then 
would have to show that the effect of the fraudulent action jeopardizes 
continued company support of the profit-sharing plan, reduces com­
pany contributions to the plan, or likely will force the company into 
bankruptcy. Upon the showing of a lack of other garnishable assets, 
and upon the showing of harm to the plan, either directly through the 
employer's inability to continue maintenance of the plan, or by way of 
a civil or criminal judgment against the wrongdoer, the company 
would be entitled to garnish the wrongdoer's plan assets. If the com­
pany establishes that the wrongdoer had other assets adequate to cover 
the company's loss, the garnishment would be disallowed. 
The Crawford facts also provide an example applicable to the pa­
rameters of this amendment. In Crawford, plan fiduciaries misapplied 
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plan assets for their own gain, and made no provision for paying back 
the profit-sharing funds. Plan participants obtained a civil judgment 
and then sought to garnish the wrongdoers' plan interests. Under the 
amendment, the plan participants must show that the wrongdoers 
have either no assets or have insufficient assets with which to pay back 
the plan before the court will proceed to the next step of the analysis. 
The plan participants must then show harm to the plan either directly 
under section l(A)(i) of the amendment, or indirectly, by way of a 
precedent criminal or civil judgment against the wrongdoer. 
The Goldsteins owned various properties and corporations, and 
the plan participants would be forced to explore all avenues of garnish­
ment against those interests prior to garnishing the ERISA interests. 
This requirement insures that all ERISA policies are given equal con­
sideration, and satisfies the United Metal court's concern of protecting 
the wrongdoer's plan interests. While this comment advocates and 
proposes a narrow fraud amendment to ERISA's anti-alienation pro­
vision, the comment also recognizes the legitimate congressional con­
cern that plan participants' receipt of accrued pension benefits be 
protected. Forcing those seeking garnishment of plan assets to explore 
all other assets of the wrongdoer gives effect to this congressional 
policy.204 
Under both Crawford and United Metal, any civil court hearing 
evidence of the fiduciary breach, fraud, or embezzlement must apply a 
"clear and convincing evidence" standard. The clear and convincing 
evidence standard falls between the "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard required in most civil cases and the "beyond a reasonable 
204. One author, discussing the fraud exception as it arose in St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985), argues that a fraud exception to 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision weakens ERISA's preemptive powers, because the appli­
cation of the fraud exception is not uniform. See Note, Weakening ERISA s Preemptive 
Powers: St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Cox Creates an Implied Exception to the 
Anti-Alienation Provision for Employee Fraud, 6 V A. TAX REV. 185, 218-19 (1986). The 
author asserts that any exception to the anti-alienation provision should be enacted by the 
legislature, id. at 220, a concern that is addressed by this comment through the proposed 
fraud amendment. 
The author's secondary concern is that an implied or legislated fraud exception will 
signal a return to the days of "forfeiture" or "bad boy" clauses. Id. at 217. These clauses, 
placed in retirement plan contracts, allowed an employer to evade payment of retirement 
benefits to an employee if the employee was "disloyal" or fired for cause. Id. at 203 (citing 
Lee, ERISA's "Bad Boy':' Forfeiture for Cause in Retirement Plans, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.l. 
137 (1977)). The proposed amendment provides that ERISA plan assets stand last in the 
line of the wrongdoer's garnishable interests in cases of plan participant fraud or fiduciary 
breach. In addition, employers must show a loss to the plan participants prior to garnish­
ment. These amendment provisions are in place specifically to avoid the unconscionable 
forfeitures which occurred prior to ERISA's enactment. See Lee, supra at 141-48. 
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doubt" criminal evidentiary standard.20S The amendment requires 
proof by clear and convincing evidence in a civil adjudication for two 
reasons. First, the anti-alienation provision's underlying premise is to 
protect plan participants from their own financial improvidence, and 
from third party judgment creditors.206 The "clear and convincing" 
standard requires those persons seeking attachment or garnishment to 
prove their claims on a higher evidentiary level, and therefore provides 
greater protection to the wrongdoer/plan participant. Secondly, a 
clear and convincing evidence standard traditionally has been applied 
to fraud claims, and therefore should be applied to fraud claims raised 
under the anti-alienation provision.207 
V. CONCLUSION 
An examination of ERISA's purpose and legislative history indi­
cates that Congress intended ERISA to serve as a protection for all 
private pension plan participants and their beneficiaries. 208 Courts 
that find in favor of an implied fraud exception give effect to this 
policy. 
205. MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 340 (E. Cleary ed. 1984). 
206. General Motors v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 460-63 (6th Cir. 1980). The protection 
against a plan participant's financial improvidence is distinguishable from protection 
against fraud judgments. While Congress did not want to penalize the plan participant for 
poor financial judgment, this comment asserts that Congress had no intention to protect 
those persons who commit fraud against ERlSA-qualified plans. 
207. MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 340 (E. Cleary, ed. 1984) ("Among the classes of 
cases to which this special standard of persuasion has been applied are . . . charges of 
fraud....") Many jurisdictions apply this standard to fraud claims. See. e.g., Robertson v. 
White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 968 (W.D. Ark. 1986)(Arkansas law requires fraud to be proved 
by clear and convincing evidence); Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238, 
243 (D.D.C. 1986)(District of Columbia requires plaintiffs to prove fraud by clear and 
convincing evidence); Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. 
Supp. 643, 652 (E.D. Va. 1986)(Virginia statutes require clear and convincing evidence 
standard in fraud claims); Maley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 621, 
625 (D. Pa. 1985)(pennsylvania law provides that fraud must be proven by clear and con­
vincing evidence); Lynnhaven Dolphin Corp. v. E.L.O. Enter., Inc., 776 F.2d 538, 541 (5th 
Cir. 1985)(proof of fraud in Louisiana requires clear and convincing evidence); Ekern v. 
Sew/Fit Co., Inc., 622 F. Supp. 367, 373 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Illinois requires clear and con­
vincing evidence in order to show fraud). 
A few jurisdictions, however, apply less than a clear and convincing standard to fraud 
claims. See, e.g., Miller v. Lay Trucking Co., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1326. 1339 (N.D. Ind. 
1985) (Indiana law provides that fraud may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence). 
In one jurisdiction requiring less than clear and convincing evidence, a United States Court 
of Appeals allowed a jury instruction requiring only a preponderance of the evidence to 
prove fraud, but stated: "[A]n instruction noting the 'clear and convincing evidence' stan­
dard would have been more satisfactory ...." First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 
1307, 1320 (5th Cir. 1977). 
208. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text. 
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The implied exception protects the majority of plan participants 
from fraud that causes a loss to the ERISA plan. It also allows the 
participants to recover a part of their loss, as well as reinforcing basic 
principles of equity and trust law principles Congress intended to ap­
ply to ERISA. . 
Congress should amend ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The 
proposed amendment provides a guide for congressional action, pro­
vides adequate protection of the wrongdoer's plan interests, and gives 
courts a standard with which to examine and decide plan interest gar­
nishment claims. The model also upholds the overall ERISA policy of 
protecting the plan participant, and will provide more uniformity in 
court decisions. 
Michael Alan Frazee 
